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How have Government Policies Driven Rural Credit in India: 















This paper makes a modest attempt to identify structural breaks in outstanding credit of rural 
branches of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India during the period of 1969 to 2009. With 
the use of endogenous method, we find three possible structural shifts in growth, i.e. 1981, 
1989 and 1999 and thus four different regimes of growth and performance. These structural 
changes are analyzed with respect to branch licensing policy and priority sector lending by 
the Schedule Commercial Banks. Empirical evidence and growth performance shows that 
such policies have been instrumental in changing the off-take of rural credit in a significant 
way. The study also finds corroborative evidence of break dates and growth performance in 
evaluating the outcomes of the prevailing banking policies.  
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How Have Government Policies Driven Rural Credit in India: 




This paper makes a modest attempt to identify structural breaks in outstanding credit of rural 
branches of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
1 in India during the period of 1969 to 2009 
and analyzes growth phases vis-à-vis banking policies. The subject is related to analysis of 
policy  interventions  in  banking  sector  essentially  by  the  governments  of  less  developed 
countries. It has been a celebrated argument that there lies a high welfare cost of exclusion of 
under privileged of the society from financial access. This leads to the proposition that reach 
of banking services in rural areas be considered as a precursor for growth of an economy. 
Without exception, post independence, India also witnessed several government interventions 
to ensure credit flow to socioeconomically challenged population both in rural and urban 
areas. Fourteen SCBs were nationalized in 1969 with further addition of six banks under 
public ownership in 1980. In 1977 government came out with a policy which stipulated that 
to open one branch in banked area the particular bank had to open four branches in locations 
with no prior formal credit and savings institutions (referred as un-banked area). This policy 
(here after referred as 1:4 branch licensing policy) continued to be operational till 1990. Also 
from mid sixties government stipulated lending target to agriculture, small scale and cottage 
industries for SCBs.  
 
While need for these policy intervention to augment credit in rural
2 centers has been at the 
centre  of  several  discussions  for  quite  a  long  time,  there  has  been  limited  empirical 
investigation to justify the necessity of such policy intervention. Five years ago Burgess and 
Pande  (2005)  came  out  with  their  scholarly  contribution  in  the  field  of  rural  credit  by 
providing empirical evidence that much discussed 1:4 branch licensing policy augmented the 
flow of rural credit and eventually contributed to poverty alleviation. Not surprisingly, the 
argument  of  Burgess  and  Pande  (2005)  stirred  up  much  debate.  Critics  such  as  Kochar 
(2005), Pangariya (2006) raised serious reservation regarding identification issue as period of 
1:4  branch  licensing  policy  coincides  with  Integrated  Rural  Development  Programme 
(IRDP), one of the largest poverty alleviation programme in India. Observing the divergent 
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findings  of  an  endogenous  method  of  detecting  structural  breaks  and  growth  regimes  of 
outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs. Then attempt to relate the policy perspectives 
with the observed growth regimes. The main reason is the centrality of credit from formal 
financial system in Indian agrarian economy, which employs around two third of population.  
 
The structure of the paper is arranged as follows; section II covers the focus of the study and 
literature review, section III deals with methodology and data, section IV presents the results 
and their implications, section V discusses policy implications and concludes. 
 
2. FOCUS AND REVIEWS 
 
The focus of the study is on estimating trend breaks in the off-take of credit in rural areas in 
india, and thus highlighting the perspective of trend breaks.  The analysis becomes useful as 
it arguably furthers our understanding of growth phases and performance. The literature on 
the aspects of rural credit, empirical investigations and policy analysis is replete with studies 
and arguments. A survey of few relevant papers and arguments can be taken as follows. 
Studies of Kumar (2004) and Burgess and Pande (2005) have attempted to address the impact 
of  1:4  branch  licensing  policy  on  rural  credit  and  have  critically  argued  on  policy 
perspectives.  Kumar  (2004)  employed  the  methodology  developed  by  Perron  (1989)  to 
exogenously  find  a  trend  break  in  time  series  and  observed  that  significant  decline  in 
proportion of credit from rural branches to cumulative credit from SCBs after 1991. The 
study gives a proposition that 1:4 branch licensing policy which was withdrawn in 1990, had 
it continued, would have pushed the credit off-take in rural areas. Thus a trend break could 
have been expected around 1991 and possibly marked the start of a new regime.  
 
Burgess and Pande (2005) attempted to find empirical evidence on (a) whether state led 1:4 
branch licensing policy had resulted into branch expansion in un-banked area of states with 
lower  number  of  branch  network  and,  (b)  whether  this  policy  had  positively  contributed 
towards rural credit disbursement. They considered the number of bank branches in a state in 
the year 1961 (making it base year) as an indicator of initial financial development. The key 
findings of Burgess and Pande (2005) rest on their observation that ‘between 1977 and 1990 
rural branch licensing was relatively higher in financially less developed states’, which they 
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after 1990.’ Thus, guided by their profit motive banks had opened branches in developed 
states till 1977. The same trend was observed again after 1990 when the 1:4 branch licensing 
policy was withdrawn and banks were permitted to (i) choose branch locations purely on 
profit motive and (ii) closure of non profitable branches was allowed (RBI, 1991). Their 
linear trend break models found statistical support of trend reversal for 1977 and 1990, the 
start  and  withdrawal  of  the  said  policy.  Based  on  this  evidence,  the  authors  argued  that 
branch licensing policy had contributed towards opening of additional branches in unbanked 
area resulting into higher credit disbursement. 
 
Kochar (2005) and Panagariya (2006) have critically assessed the findings of Burgess and 
Pande (2005) by arguing that incidence of higher credit off-take cannot be attributed solely to 
the branch licensing policy as during the same period government had put thrust on massive 
poverty reduction programs such as IRDP. The program was primarily to provide subsidized 
credit to economically challenged section  of the  society  for income generating activities. 
Kochar (2005) and Panagariya (2006) argue that isolating the effects of two programs would 
be difficult as both were operating simultaneously. As bank branch was the primary delivery 
window in IRDP, government thrust on bringing more number of eligible populations under 
IRDP had driven opening of more branches in unbanked areas which in turn augmented 
credit flow in those areas.  
 
Taking these arguments into account, there appears no major consensus on a particular policy 
behind  credit  off  take  in  rural  centers.  Given  this  backdrop,  we  make  an  attempt  to 
understand the underlying trends and growth phases of outstanding credit of rural branches of 
SCBs. This in turn would help analyze the arguments of banking policies in terms of branch 
licensing and credit off-take. The approach is to first find structural changes in the long term 
credit to rural India, revisit the argument of 1:4 branch licensing policy and estimate the 
growth in separate regimes as led by prevailing banking polices. 
 
Our  study  also  differs  from  studies  of  Kumar  (2004)  and  Burgess  and  Pande  (2005)  in 
another  dimension.  While  both  the  studies  use  ‘proportion  of  outstanding  credit  of  rural 
branches to cumulative credit from SCBs’, we use the absolute figure of outstanding credit of 
rural branches of SCBs. The difference in choice of series might possibly have implication on 
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to cumulative credit, which might show a different trend behavior as compared to the actual 
figure  of  outstanding  credit.  We  find  it  more  appropriate  to  use  the  actual  figure  of 
outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs as it captures the volume of flow of credit in 
rural locations. The ratio may appear to be more appropriate for a sectoral share analysis, 
which presently is not the focus of our study. Moreover, using absolute values facilitates the 
estimation of differential in the shifts (of mean and growth rates) over time. The method and 
estimation procedure is detailed as follows. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Theoretically, a trend break in a time series data can be established in one of the following 
ways. First is to identify the break points with prior information of the break date and then 
validate it using appropriate tests. Such a method is exogenous in nature as the possibility of 
a break is known a-priory to the researcher. Studies of Kumar (2004) and Burgess and Pande 
(2005) use such technique. Second, the endogenous method, which relies on the proposition 
that ‘let data speak about itself’. Thus such a method does not use any prior information 
about a possibility of break(s) at any given point of time and also does not exogenously 
impose  a  breakpoint  for  validation.  In  this  paper  we  adopt  the  endogenous  approach  to 
identify the trend breaks and further attempt to relate with the policy decision(s) rather than 
attempting to establish that a particular policy was responsible for the trend break, which may 
or may not hold true. With the estimation of break dates, we further calculate the growth of 
the different regimes and analyze their performance. 
 
We  use  the  methodology  developed  by  Bai  and  Perron  (1998,  2003)  which  allows 
simultaneous  estimation  of  breaks  in  trend.  The  structure  of  the  model  is  based  upon  a 
dynamic programming algorithm which minimizes global sum of squared residuals in an 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression. The regression model is estimated with (m) possible 
breaks, or equivalently (m+1) regimes. We employ a trend model of the type, lnYt = ß0 + ß1t, 
where, Yt is value of outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs and (t) is time in years 
from 1969 to 2009. The coefficient (ß1) indicates the rate of growth over time. The estimation 
allows for a change in both parameters ß0 and ß1 to vary over time and thus results into (m) 
separate parameters for (m+1) regimes. In particular, a model for estimating trend with (m) 
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    lnYt = ß0m+1 + ß1m+1 t+ ut, where  t = Tm + 1, . . . T  [T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T] 
 
This model as mentioned is a pure structural change model as it allows a break(s) in the level 
(intercept) and in the slope coefficient. The analysis is to determine the number and location 
of the breakpoints Tj for j = 1 to m. In computing this, the parameter used is the length of the 
segment (h) which indicates the minimum number of observation in one segment on which 
the OLS is computed. This is alternatively expressed as a bandwidth parameter 0 < (ε) <1 
which gives (h) as a fraction of the number of observations. Thus if (ε) is 0.15, then for 41 
observations, the value of (h) would be 6. This size of segment would then allow upto 5 
breaks (or 6 regimes) in the series. Further, the main computational effort is to compute a 
triangular Residual Sum of Square (RSS) matrix, which gives the residual sum of squares for 
a segment starting at observation (j) and ending at j' with j < j'. Following the estimation of 
possible break dates, Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) and Wang (2006) have suggested the use 
of Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to identify the number of trend breaks in case of 
trending  regressors.  This  is  based  on  the  proposition  given  by  Bai  (1997)  wherein  it  is 
demonstrated that stationarity of regressors or disturbances is not required for estimation of 
break dates. Wang (2006) also shows that the BIC criteria can incorporate trending regressors 
and is demonstrated to be superior in selecting break dates under such scheme. Break dates 
are thus given by the values for which the BIC is at minimum. In this study the minimum 
length of the segment (h) is taken as (6). This might involve an element of judgment in 
selecting the length of the segment. However it may be argued that six years (and above) 
should serve as a sufficient time to analyze the trend behavior of the variable. The choice of a 
smaller segment, though statistically valid, might not adequately capture the variation and 
may not be plausible for analyzing long term structural shifts. As the study comprises of 41 
data points, a value of (h=6) allows a maximum of five break points and six possible regimes.  
 
We also iterate this process by taking values of (h) from 6 to 9 to take into account the 
variation in break dates as estimated by the model. We finally report break dates when (h)=6 
as acceptable break dates, as the same break dates were invariant with the value of hÎ(6,9). 
This fulfills the criteria that (h) is selected such that it is a minimum value which is both 
statistically meaningful and significant
3. Following break dates, different intercepts and trend 
coefficients are reported which correspond observed regimes. Estimation is done using the 
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underlying  trend  and  rate  of  growth,  a  structural  break(s)  in  the  series  supports  the 
proposition that flow of credit has not remained constant over time and that indicates why 
different growth phases are observed.       
 
The data used in the study is the credit outstanding of rural branches of SCBs. The frequency 
of the data is yearly and is collected for the period of forty one years starting from 1969, the 
year of first phase of bank nationalization till 2009. The data source is EPWRF (2004) for 
data upto 2002 and various volumes of Banking Statistics: Basic Statistical Returns published 
by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for rest of the years. In Figure 1, we graph the amount of 
outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs from the year 1969 to 2009. A closer look at the 
graph shows a slow down in outstanding credit during early nineties. Also a sharp increase in 
credit outstanding is visible from the graph during first half of 2000s.   
 
Figure 1: Outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs  


































Source: EPWRF(2004) and Banking Statistics: Basic Statistical Returns, RBI 
 
4. RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
With  use  of  the  endogenous  model  and  the  estimation  following  Zeileis  et  al  (2002), 
estimates of break dates come to 1981, 1989 and 1999. Among all possibilities of (m) break 
dates, given the value of (h=6) the BIC value is minimum for (m)=3 corresponding to years 
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1988-89 and 1989-90. A 97.5 per cent confidence interval around 1981 ranges from 1980 to 
1982, for 1989, the interval is 1988 to 1990, while for the year 1999 the range is 1998 to 
2000. The differential in the estimates of intercept and trend coefficient can be noted as in 
Table-1.  
Table1: Growth rate of outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs 




1969 - 1981      6.760  0.285*  32.97 
1982 - 1989      8.240  0.177*  19.36 
1990 - 1999      9.798  0.100*  10.52 
2000 - 2009      7.729  0.166*  18.06 
    
# Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
4.  
     *Value significant at 1 percent level  
 
It may be noted from the growth rates figures that growth had shown a deceleration from 33 
per cent during the regime of 1969–81 to 19 per cent during 1982 – 89. It further decelerated 
to nearly 11 per cent during 1990 – 99 while it has shown improvement to about 18 per cent 
in the last regime.  
 
The first break point found in our study may not be coinciding with break dates, 1977 and 
1990 as predicted by Burgess and Pande (2005) but remains fairly close to them even though 
slightly different time series are used. The second break date estimated by us (i.e.1989) and 
by Burgess and Pande (i.e. 1990) are not common but falls within the same interval [1988, 
1990]. Similarly the break date of 1991 observed by Kumar (2005) does not fall within the 
above interval but remains very close to our estimation. Hence, regarding the second trend 
break the outcome of endogenous and exogenous method lie within a narrow interval. While, 
we observe a third break date in 1999, the exogenous method of the earlier studies did not 
allow them to simultaneously estimate multiple break dates. Also that their purpose was to 
examine the possibility of breaks around 1977 and 1990 as period marked by the introduction 
and withdrawal of 1:4 branch licensing policy. Thus, the endogenous method employed here 
for simultaneous estimation of break dates draws its superiority over the exogenous one.      
  
In the next step we attempt to find the possible explanations which might have led to trend 
breaks in 1981, 1989 and 1999 as well as varying growth rate in four regimes. The high 
growth  rate  in  the  first  regime  may  be  primarily  attributed  to  the  low  base  during  pre 
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1150 million, which reached to INR 36000 million by 1981 (EPWRF, 2004). Thus results 
into a CAGR of around 33 per cent in the first regime. The reasons for bank nationalization 
was to provide banking services in previously unbanked or under-banked rural areas, ensure 
substantial credit to specific activities including agriculture, and bring certain disadvantaged 
groups  under  the  ambit  of  formal  credit  source.  The  number  of  rural  branches  of  SCBs 
increased  to  19453  in  1981  from  that  of  1443  in  1969  (EPWRF,  2004).  The  observed 
phenomenal  growth  may  also  be  related  to  green  revolution  in  late  sixties  from  when 
Government  thrust  was  there  to  channelize  credit  through  formal  sources  to  agricultural 
sector  as  the  country  then  was  striving  to  gain  self  sufficiency  in  food  grain.  Thus,  we 
observe that during the first regime, role of increasing network of rural branch of SCBs to 
augment growth of credit in rural areas remained at the center.  
 
Considering the estimated break dates, we observe that both first and second break dates 
estimated by us closely coincide with launch and withdrawal of 1:4 branch licensing policy. 
However the first break date is more close to the year, 1980, when IRDP
5 was extended pan 
India. Without entering into the debate of identifying a particular policy, the point which 
needs emphasis and policy attention is the importance of a delivery window to reach the 
unreached. Figure-2 highlights that from 1977 to 1991, with the exception in very few years, 
the incremental ratio
7 of rural plus semi-urban branches to urban plus metropolitan branches 
stayed at around or, even above the prescribed limit of 1:4 (EPWRF, 2004). Negative values 
of ratio during 1980 and 1986 are due to net reduction in urban plus metropolitan branches, 
while for 1995 and 2006 it corresponds to net reduction in rural plus semi-urban branches.  
The incremental ratio dropped in 1992 and went above 1 only once (to 1.9 in 1994) during 
the eighteen-year period from 1993 to 2009. This may be attributed to the government’s 
acceptance of recommendation of Narasimham Committee (RBI, 1991) which advocated that 
further branch expansion to be based on “need, business potential and financial viability of 
location” and consequently the withdrawal of 1:4 branch licensing policy. Following this, 
number of rural branches remained almost stagnant at around 35300 for consecutive three 
years (i.e., 1992 to 1994). Rural branch network from its peak at 35396 in 1994 witnessed a 
sudden decrease of 2379 rural branches, bringing down the aggregate figure to 33017 in the 
very next year (EPWRF, 2004). This is visible in Figure-3 which shows that after 1994 there 
is a declining trend in the ratio of rural plus semi urban branches to urban plus metropolitan 
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Figure 2: Incremental ratio of rural plus semi urban branches to urban plus 













































 Source: EPWRF(2004) and Banking Statistics: Basic Statistical Returns, RBI 
  


































 Source: EPWRF(2004) and Banking Statistics: Basic Statistical Returns, RBI 
 
 
From Table-1 we note that growth in outstanding credit of rural branches of SCBs had shown 
a deceleration from 19 per cent during 1982 – 89 to 10 per cent during 1990 – 99, which 
improved  to  18  per  cent  in  the  last  regime.  Here,  we  explore  the  reasons  behind  trend 
reversals  in  rural  credit  in  1989  as  well  as  1999.  The  regime  of  1990  to  1999  can  be 
characterized as a period of closure of rural branches (as discussed in earlier paragraphs) 
accompanied by low growth in agriculture credit. Table-2 shows that between 1990 and 1999 
advance of SCBs to agriculture and allied sector grew only at 8.6 per cent but picked up in 
next regime and experienced a CAGR of 22 per cent during 2000s. Credit to agriculture and 
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First  category includes short  term (i.e., seasonal) production credit and investment credit 
advanced directly to farmers for agricultural purposes. Under the second category formal 
financial agencies lend to institutions which support the agriculture activity. Such institutions 
include dealers of seed, fertilizer, pesticide, irrigation equipments, farm machinery and feeds, 
agriculture storage units, food processing and agro based industries, Non Banking Financial 
Companies (NBFCs) and Microfinance Institutions (MFI) which borrow for on lending to 
agriculture, to name a few. Table-2 indicates that revival of credit to agriculture and allied 
activities after 2000 is primarily attributed to significantly higher growth rate in ‘indirect 
finance’. Between 2000 and 2009 ‘indirect finance’ recorded a CAGR of 23.3 per cent as 
against only 3.0 per cent during the previous regime. This sharp growth in agriculture credit 
and in particular indirect finance
4 has contributed towards upward trend reversal in rural 
credit. This may have resulted from continuous thrust from government for meeting priority 
sector target (40 per cent of net bank credit) and particularly target of agricultural lending (18 
per cent of net bank credit) during 2000s, i.e. last regime in our study..  
 
Table 2: Rate of growth of credit outstanding from rural branches of SCBs to 
agriculture and allied activities (1990-2009, in % per annum) 
  1990-1999  2000-09 
Growth rate of credit outstanding to:     
Agriculture and allied activities  8.6  22.0 
   Direct finance  9.0  21.9 
   Indirect finance  3.0  23.3 
 Source: Banking Statistics: Basic Statistical Returns, RBI: Mumbai 
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In our attempt to find structural breaks in the trend of rural credit, we find three possible 
shifts in the long term trend behavior of the variable. The years 1981, 1989 and 1999 are 
three time periods where the trend of rural credit shows changes in a significant way. These 
break dates estimated using the endogenous method are within close range of dates estimated 
by studies of Kumar (2004) and Burgess and Pande (2005). The break dates also have policy 
relevance as they indicate the change in behavior and performance of the variable in question. 
Findings show that in post years of withdrawal of the 1:4 branch licensing policy, there has 
been a visible decline in the off-take of rural credit, particularly in the period of the 1990s. 
But 2000 onwards, branch licensing shows a near stagnation and even a minor decline in 
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be  attributed  to  the  higher  growth  rate  in  the  indirect  finance  to  agriculture  and  allied 
activities as a result of ongoing governmental thrust on meeting the priority sectors lending 
targets by SCBs.  
 
It has been observed that credit off take in rural areas is very much sensitive to the network of 
SCBs in rural areas or, stipulation of particular target for lending to agriculture. In the post 
liberalization period when nationalized Banks were pushed to become competitive against 
their  private  and  foreign  counterparts  it  might  appear  to  be  a  duality  on  the  part  of  the 
government to compel the nationalized banks to run their rural branches which are nonviable, 
while the importance of last mile delivery channel can not be ignored. Thus, to ensure timely 
and adequate credit to the rural population at affordable cost there may be every need of 
increased involvement of local people having wider knowledge of the local area, economy 
and people. Government’s acceptance of Khan Committee’s (RBI, 2005) recommendation of 
promoting business facilitator and business correspondence, an alternative to rural branch as 
a last mile delivery channel, who will act as an agent on behalf of bank to reach the banking 
services to the rural clients, can be viewed as an welcome move in the direction of achieving 
desired growth in credit off take.  
  
Notes 
1.  In India Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) are those banks which have been included 
in the Second Schedule of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act, 1934. 
 
2.  ‘Rural’ group includes centers with population 10,000 or, less. ‘Urban’ group includes 
centers with population above 10,000 and upto 1,00,000. ‘Semi Urban’ group includes 
centers  with  population  above  1,00,000  and  upto  10,00,000.  ‘Metropolitan’  group 
includes centers with population above 10,00,000. 
 
3.   We thank Achim Zeileis for his comment on this issue. 
 
4.  Compound  Annual  Growth  Rate  (CAGR)  is  calculated  using  the  function:                  
Ln(Yt) = α+ßt, where (Y) is the credit variable and (t) is time. The rate of growth is 
[{antilog(ß) – 1} * 100] 
 
5.   IRDP was launched in 1978 which was extended to pan India in 1980 
 
6.   We take note of the fact that in recent times the definition of ‘indirect finance’ has been 
broadened to include various kinds of institutional credit. 
 
7.   Incremental ratio is defined as [∆R+∆SU] / [∆U+∆M] where (R) is number of Rural 
branches,  (SU)  is  Semi  Urban,  (U)  is  Urban,  (M)  is  Metropolitan,  and  ∆  is  change 
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